

FORM 3020b  
7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER EUR 30

TOTAL COPIES 6

RUN BY 28

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN  
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

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ACTION UNIT

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FILE

VR

DDO

ACTION #

1 604753

EIA836

PAGE 01

IN 795558

TOR:151902Z JAN 76

68796

SECRET 151705Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE 68796

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLKMBALL

NELSON FROM MEYER

REF: 09548

1. REFERENCE FROM                      INFORMS                      THAT SENATOR

HART OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE WILL BE ATTENDING CONFERENCE AT

                     30 JANUARY TO 1 FEBRUARY. HE HAS REQUESTED THAT                     

ARRANGE WITH                      FOR BRIEFINGS ON SERIES OF SUBJECTS OF

INTEREST TO HIM AND SELECT COMMITTEE. THEY ARE THE DIVISION OF

LABOR BETWEEN A. SECURITY AND THE SECRET SERVICE AND B. INTEL-

LIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. HE GOES ON TO REQUEST BRIEFINGS

ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR COVERT OPERATIONS AND POLIT-

ICAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL OPERATIONS WITH                      IN

ADDITION HE WANTS BRIEFINGS ON INTELLIGENCE BUDGET ALLOCATION AND

COORDINATION AND SYSTEM FOR APPROVAL OF MAJOR INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS.

SENATOR HART ALSO WANTS A BRIEFING ON                     

AND HOW IT WORKS.

2.                      HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY                      OFFICER AND                      HAS

SECRET

\*Not Renewed

7-71 MFG. 2/75

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T 604753

EIA836

PAGE 02-02

IN 795558

TOR:151902Z JAN 76

68796

ADVISED THAT [ ] WILL DO THEIR BEST TO PROVIDE INFORMATION SENATOR HART WANTS BUT THAT SOME OF THE INFORMATION COULD NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE. HE IS PROPOSING A JOINT MEETING WITH [ ] [ ] FOR GENERAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND WITH [ ] AT [ ] ON THE WORKINGS OF [ ] THERE WILL BE CHANGES IN THE SCHEDULE AND [ ] WILL BE ADVISED BY [ ] AT A LATER DATE.

3. THERE IS NO INDICATION IN THE [ ] TRAFFIC THAT CIA HAS BEEN INFORMED BUT WE PRESUME THAT OFFICIALS OF THE AGENCY HAVE OR WILL BE CONTACTED BY SENATOR HART OF HIS STAFF ON THE MATTER.

4. NO FILE. E2, IMPDET.

**S E C R E T**







WALLER  
WALKER  
MAGE

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY *sf* PER *Sep 11/72* TOTAL COPIES *10* / RUN BY

(24)

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

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DCI/REVIEW STAFF,

CS/RF,

DDD

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T 595025

EIA412

PAGE 01-01

IN 791659

TOR:122154Z JAN 76.

21007

S E C R E T 122040Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE [ ] 21007

TO: [ ] INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL RANDALL AND ADDABBO

REFS: A. [ ] 35606 (iw787635)

B. [ ] 35661 (iw790579)

[ ] STATION MUCH APPRECIATES ADVANCED REPORTING  
ON CODELS. WAS HELPFUL WITH THE RANDALL GROUP, AND AM SURE  
WILL BE VALUABLE WITH ADDABBO GROUP AS WELL. REGARDS. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T







FORM 3020b  
7-71 MFG. 2/75CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28PER SOP 112TOTAL COPIES 10-1

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S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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DCI/REVIEW STAFFCS/RF DDO, SA/DO, D/LC

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T 592728

EIA152

PAGE 01

IN 790651

TOR:112233Z JAN 76

21000

S E C R E T 112200Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE [ ] 21000

TO: IMMEDIATE [ ] INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: [ ] 15837 (in 787572)

1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DESIRES REFERENCED MEETING AT 0800  
AND WILL EXPECT CONTACT FOR DETAILS UPON HIS ARRIVAL.

2. HE IS VERY EASY TO TALK TO AND AM SURE YOU WILL ENJOY  
THE MEETING. HE MET HERE WITH HEADS OF LIAISON SERVICES, ABOUT  
45 MINUTES WITH EACH. HIS PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS ARE WHAT THEY  
THINK OF THE CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS, WHAT IMPACT HAVE THEY HAD  
ON FOREIGN INTEL RELATIONS, ETC.

3. HE HAS A MINOR HEARING PROBLEM, SO SHOULD ARRANGE TO  
HAVE HIM SEATED AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO [ ]

4. BEST REGARDS. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

CABLE REC DISSEM BY 28 PER SP112 TOTAL COPIES 10 RUN BY

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**S E C R E T**

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17

RF FILE

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RF FILE VR DC/REVIEW STAFF

CS/RF, DDO, S/DO, D/OLC

## ACTION

592741

EIA165

PAGE 01

IN 7906152

TOR:112313Z JAN 76

21901

S E C R E T 112305Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE	21001
------	-------

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA RTBUSHEL (DUCKETT)

SUBJECT: MILFORD VISIT

1. COS SPENT ABOUT EIGHT HOURS WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ON 10 JANUARY, AND BELIEVE HE WENT AWAY TOTALLY SATISFIED THAT HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED HIS OBJECTIVES HERE. HE MET WITH

MINUTES AND ALL MEETINGS WENT WELL. ALSO WORKED THE MEETING IN WITH THE NASA REP AND THAT ALSO APPEARED TO GO WELL, AS DID THE MEETING ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT.

2. INCIDENTAL CONVERSATIONS HELD [REDACTED]  
DEALING WITH TERRORISM QUESTION. ENTIRE DELEGATION WAS VERY  
FRIENDLY AND A PLEASURE TO DEAL WITH. [REDACTED] PRESENCE  
WAS AN ASSET.

3. DETAILED SUMMARY OF DAY'S ACTIVITY BEING FORWARDED  
THIS DATE. E2 IMPDET.

**S E C R E T**

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 47 PER SOP 112 TOTAL COPIES 10-2 RUN BY

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S E C R E T

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DCI (REVIEW STAFF)

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ACTION #

DDO CS/RP SA/DDO OLC

T 592369

EIA799

PAGE 01

IN 790579

TOR:111013Z JAN 76

35661

S E C R E T 110937Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE [ ] 35661

TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE [ ]

NIACT [ ]

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL ADDABBO

1. COS BRIEFED REPS ADDABBO, EDWARDS AND ROBINSON AND MESSERS PRESTON, SNODGRASS AND CARY ON 11 JAN IN COS OFFICE. ONE HOUR SESSION WAS BASICALLY QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD CONCERNING TARGETS, OVERALL BUDGET, FIELD PORTION OF BUDGET, ALLOCATION OF COSTS TO COMMUNIST TARGETS VS INTERNAL TARGETS, RELATIONSHIP WITH LIAISON, ASSESSMENT OF GOVT. STABILITY AND INSURGENCY POTENTIAL, MEANS OF ACQUISITION OF SECRET INFORMATION, MOST IMPORTANT REPORTING OVER PAST YEAR, AMOUNT OF [ ]

MALAYSIAN INSURGENCY,

AND CONSTRAINTS OF COS SPENDING.

2. QUESTIONS WERE NOT PERSUED WITH MUCH VIGOR AND GROUP SEEMED NOT TOO DIFFICULT TO SATISFY. EXCEPTION WAS SNODGRASS, A YOUNG AGGRESSIVE STAFFER WHO OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO DELVE IN MORE DETAIL BUT WAS RESTRAINED BY TIME LIMITATIONS (THE

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

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T 592369

EIA799

PAGE 02-02

IN 790579

TOR:111013Z JAN 76

35661

CONGRESSMEN WERE HUNGRY AND WANTED TO GET OFF TO LUNCH).

3. THE DELEGATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CODEL RANDALL.

NONE HAD THE INTENSITY OR INTEREST OF REP MILFORD OR THE TOUGH  
POLITICAL PERCEPTION OF REPS WILSON/DICKENSON. MR. CARY WAS QUITE  
HELPFUL IN ORGANIZING THE GROUP AND PROVIDING CLUES TO THEIR  
OUTLOOK.

4. OVERALL, BELIEVE DELEGATION WAS SATISFIED THOUGH THEY  
PROBABLY DO NOT CONSIDER THIS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THEIR TRIP.  
E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER SOP#1.2 TOTAL COPIES 10-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ACTION UNIT

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ORF. FILE VR DCI/Review STAFF, CSRF,  
DDO, SA/DDO, DOLC

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ACTION #

T 588800

EIA313

PAGE 01-01

IN 789314

TOR:091229Z JAN 76

20992

S E C R E T 090033Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE [ ] 20992

TO: [ ] INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHGONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: [ ] 15837 (787572)

1. COS WILL TAKE MATTER UP WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASAP

ARRIVAL [ ] AND ADVISE.

2. REGARDS. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

## OUTGOING MESSAGE

15-2

1			7	
2			8	
3			9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO DCI

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

082336Z DIRECTOR

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

789926

CONF: C/EA8 INFO: FILE DCI Review Staff, CS/RF,  
DDO, SATOON, D/OLC,

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 22  
0 NO INDEX  
0 RETURN TO PER SOP  
0 IF FILES # 112

TO: PRIORITY [ ] INFO [ ]

RYBAT PLMHCONGA 4

REF: [ ] 35600 | IN 787573\* | 4

1. STATION APPEARS TO HAVE HANDLED VISIT OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IN FINE FASHION. REF WILL BE HELPFUL IN FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS HERE. 4

2. PARAGRAPH NINE, REFERENCE GIVES US SOME PROBLEMS. OBVIOUSLY, EVEN FACT THAT HE WAS BRIEFED BY CIA STATION CHIEF [ ] SENSITIVE SINCE THAT FACT, <sup>IF PUBLISHED,</sup> WILL CAUSE US EMBARRASSMENT

[ ] PLUS

CALLING UNWANTED ATTENTION TO STATION. [ ]

3. THEREFORE REQUEST STATION FORWARD "NON-CLASSIFIED" VERSION OF BRIEFING AND YOGA MEETING BY CABLE. HEADQUARTERS

DATE:  
ORIG:  
UNIT:  
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION  
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET  
CL BY: 058913

*Mr. Waller copy*

## OUTGOING MESSAGE

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 PAGE 2 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

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INFO: FILE

DIRECTOR

DISSEM BY:

NO INDEX

RETURN TO PER

IP FILES #

789926

WILL HANDLE HERE WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SO THAT STATION  
 OPERATIONS INCLUDING LIAISON EQUITIES ARE PROTECTED.4

4. [REDACTED] IF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAKES  
 REQUEST FOR UNCLASSIFIED VERSIONS OF MEETING AND BRIEFINGS WITH/  
 BY STATION AND LIAISON STATION SHOULD AGREE FORWARD TO HEADQUARTERS  
 AND WE WILL HANDLE IN SIMILAR FASHION [REDACTED] E2, IMPDET.

DATE: 8 JAN 76

ORIG: [REDACTED]

UNIT: DCEA DC

EXT: 9373

William E. Nelson

WILLIAM E. NELSON DDO

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

OLC MR. WHITE {DRAFT}

SA/DDO [REDACTED] {TELECOORD}

CEA/PMI [REDACTED]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT.

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 058913



























7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER                      TOTAL COPIES 10-1 RUN BY                     PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED                     **S E C R E T**REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN  
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ACTION #

T 583972

EIA590

PAGE 01-01

IN 787506

TOR:072129Z JAN 76

20980

**S E C R E T** 072100Z JAN 76 STAFFCITE                      20980

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: DIRECTOR 787555

1. APPOINTMENTS WITH LIAISON HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY  
ARRANGED. CONG. MILFORD WILL MEET WITH                     

2. COS                      DISCUSSIONS TENTATIVELY SET FOR  
0830-1000. ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATE 30 MINUTES MEETING WITH  
EACH LIAISON OFFICER, SO SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN AMPLE TIME  
FOR MILFORD TO REJOIN GROUP FOR AFTERNOON ACTIVITIES. CAN  
EXTEND DURATION OF MEETINGS IF HE DESIRES. E2, IMPDET,

**S E C R E T**

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PER SEP# 112

TOTAL COPIES

10-1

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ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ORY FILE VR DCI (REVIEW STAFF),  
DOO, CS/RF, SA/DOO, P/OLC

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T 584270

EIA882

PAGE 01

IN 787572

TOR:080001Z JAN 76

15837

S E C R E T 070240Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE [REDACTED] 15837

TO: [REDACTED] INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 787959

B. DIRECTOR 787555

*file  
senator travel*

PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD THAT COS [REDACTED] CAN ARRANGE

15 JANUARY 0800 HOURS BREAKFAST MEETING [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AT CONGRESSMAN

MILFORD'S HOTEL. ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] BRIEFINGS ON OPERATION

DEEPFREEZE SCHEDULED FOR MORNING OF 15 JAN. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAY

PREFER TO MEET WITH COS [REDACTED]

CONCURS WITH THIS ARRANGEMENT. TRANSPORTATION TO AIRPORT FOR

FLIGHT TO [REDACTED] WILL BE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY AFTER MEETING WITH

[REDACTED] PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PREFERENCE SO COS CAN

CONFIRM ABOVE ARRANGEMENT [REDACTED]

E2IMPDET

S E C R E T

## OUTGOING MESSAGE

10-1

1		4		7	
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AGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO DCI PAGE OF PAGES  
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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

022348Z

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

787954

CONF: CEA 3

INFO: FILE DCI (REVIEW STAFF)  
 DDD, CS/RF, SA/DDD

0 INDEX DISSEM BY 27  
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 0 IF FILES # 112

TO:

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD Y

REF: DIRECTOR 787555 |\*|

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES DESIRE MEETINGS WITH SENIOR LIAISON  
 OFFICIALS. REQUEST STATION'S PROCEED TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS WITH  
 LIAISON. E2, IMPDET.H

\*TRANSMITTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S SCHEDULE.

OLC

CEA/PMI

DATE: 2 JAN 76

ORIG:

UNIT:

DCEA

EXT:

9373

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY CEA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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E 2 IMPDET

CL BY 059913





















































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S E C R E T

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ORF. FILE VR DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CSRF,DDO, SA/DOO, JPLC

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ACTION #

T 448045

EIA080

PAGE 01-01

IN 736898

TOR:100349Z NOV 75

25761

S E C R E T 100322Z NOV 75 STAFF

CITE  25761

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF:  25730 (IN 732789)FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF 

10 NOVEMBER 1975: QUOTE SUBJECT: LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN  
MILFORD. REF:  8531. 1. LETTER HAS BEEN FORWARDED  
TO MILFORD AS RECOMMENDED, ONLY CHANGE IN TEXT PROPOSED  
PARA 5 REFTER WAS DELETION OF FINAL SENTENCE, OWING TO  
SENSITIVITY OF REFERENCE TO "CLANDESTINE OPERATION" IN LETTER  
LIKELY TO BECOME PART OF PUBLIC RECORD. UNQUOTE,

*File under  
travelling  
Secrets  
Congressman*

\* NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC.

10 NOV 75 13 48  
SA/DDO

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4A PER SP 112 TOTAL COPIES 13-2 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

S E C R E T

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DDO, CSRP, SA, DDO, DOLC

ACTION #

T 424247

EIA337

PAGE 01

IN 728294

TOR:310345Z OCT 75

25687

S E C R E T 310314Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE  25687

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF:  25649

(724591) \*

1. REGRET DELAY IN REPORTING FOLLOWUP DISCUSSION WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. HE MET WITH COS FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR MORNING OF 28 OCTOBER PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. DCOS BROUGHT THE CONGRESSMAN TO COS RESIDENCE AND THEN EXCUSED HIMSELF TO MEET WITH CONGRESSMAN LUCIEN NEDZ

2. AS IT TURNED OUT NOTHING OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE DEVELOPED AT THIS MEETING. \* R SPROVIDED BOTH AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW VARIOUS POINTS DISCUSSED IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION WITH COS EMPHASIZING THE  COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS PLUS THE MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE AND COST EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PROCEDURES.

3. COS PERMITTED THE CONGRESSMAN TO READ A STERILIZED COPY OF  THE FINAL PARAGRAPH AND THEN DISCUSSED HIS PROPOSAL TO TRY TO DEVELOP A MINORITY REPORT AROUND THIS TYPE 1-83 94 23 78B REVIEW

S E C R E T

*Send to  
congressman  
travel  
file*

31 OCT 75  
08 39  
08 39

FORM 3020b  
7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY \_\_\_\_\_ PER \_\_\_\_\_ TOTAL COPIES \_\_\_\_\_ RUN BY \_\_\_\_\_

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED \_\_\_\_\_

**S E C R E T**

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T 424247

EIA337

PAGE 02-02

IN 728294

TOR:310345Z OCT 75

25687

STUDY AND EXPLAINED WHY DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WAS FEASIBLE.  
THE CONGRESSMAN CONCURRED BUT RESTATED HIS DESIRE TO NOW  
FOLLOW UP HIS [ ] INQUIRIES AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL AND  
SOMEHOW INCORPORATE VARIOUS ASPECTS INTO HIS REPORT. HE  
REINTERATED HIS STRONG DESIRE TO MEET WITH [ ]  
COMMENDED MR. SHACKLEY TO THE CONGRESSMAN FOR SPECIFIC  
DISCUSSIONS ON THIS AREA.

4. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS QUITE PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE  
OF THE DISCUSSIONS HERE AND WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL.  
HIS PROBLEM REMAINS ONE OF FOCUS AND STAFF ASSISTANCE.  
E2, IMPDET.

\* Bonus SRC'D

**S E C R E T**

















































## OUTGOING MESSAGE

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SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY  
 AGE COI ACP TOG TPE MAO DCI  
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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP  
220018Z

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

760703

CONF: C/LA3

INFO: FILE DCI (REVIEW STAFF), CS/RE,

DDO, DDC/DD, SA/DDO

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 45  
 0 NO INDEX  
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 0 IP FILES # 112

TO:

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

REF:

B4339 IN 72313514

1. HQS AWARE OF AND HANDLING REF CASE. NO NEED FORWARD WALKER LETTER AND OTHER THAN POUCHING COPIES OF MEMOS. NO FURTHER STATION ACTION NECESSARY AT THIS TIME. PLS ADVISE BY CABLE IF ANY FURTHER INFO THIS MATTER COMES TO STATION ATTENTION.4

2. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET.4

Oct 29 3 5

SA/DDO - [ ] {TELECOORD}

DATE:

28 OCT 75

ORIG:

C/LA/CAM/PA

UNIT:

1805

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/CAM  
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET  
 CL BY 054524

## OUTGOING MESSAGE

9-1

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3		6		9	

AGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO DCI

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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP  
242332Z

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

759842

CONF: C/EA 3

INFO: FILE

DCI/REVIEW STAFF,

CS/RF

☐ INDEX

DISSEM BY: J

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PER

SOP  
112

DDO, DDO/DO: SA/DDO

TO: PRIORITY

RYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA 4

REF: DIRECTOR 759843 4

1. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ALL CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST BEAR THE SENSITIVITY INDICATOR RYBAT AND THE CRYPTONYM [REDACTED] PLMHCONGA. 4

2. FOR UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE CASES, CHIEFS OF STATION MAY AT THEIR DISCRETION USE THE [REDACTED] {PLMPTACT} [REDACTED] CHANNEL. 4

3. ALL INFORMATION RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST REPEAT MUST BE SENT TO HQS VIA CABLE REPEAT CABLE. E2, IMPDET.H

CEA/OEM:

EA/DDO:

{IN DRAFT}  
TELECOORD}

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975

ORIG: CEA/ESEC

UNIT: [REDACTED]

EXT: 1704

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 005088

## OUTGOING MESSAGE

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 PAGE 1 OF 1

CLASSIFICATION

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

242332Z

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

759843

CONF: C/EA3

INFO: FILE

DCI/RENEW STAFF

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INDEX

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117

TO: PRIORITY

RYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA Y

REF: DIRECTOR 759842 Y

1. IDENTITY IS: CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE AGENCY.

2. NO FILE. E2, IMPDET.H

CEA/OEM:

{IN DRAFT}

EA/DDO:

TELECOORD}

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975

ORIG: CEA/ESEC

EXT: 1709

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA

CLASSIFICATION

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## OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION  
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

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DATE-TIME GROUP

241922Z

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DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

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CONF

*C/EA-3*

INFO: FILE

*DCI/REVIEW STAFF, C/RF, 200, 200/00, 24/200, 9/01C*

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 0 IP FILES # *112*

IMMEDIATE

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

REF: A. [ ] 25645 | IN 722803 |  
 B. [ ] 25646 | IN 723138 | Y

1. IN VIEW OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S INTENTION AS EXPRESSED IN REF A TO SPEND ONE IF NOT SEVERAL DAYS IN DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES, BELIEVE [ ] STATION SHOULD APPROACH THIS TASK WITH FOLLOWING DATA IN MIND: Y

A. BACKGROUND. HOUSE COMMITTEE IN ITS ENTIRETY IS KEENLY INTERESTED IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOW CIA FUNCTIONS. IT MOST LIKELY CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WILL BE FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT [ ]

B. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE. BELIEVE MUCH OF WHAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD CALLS "START OF THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROCESS IN THE FIELD" CAN BE DEALT WITH IF STATION STARTS ITS BRIEFING WITH PRESENTATION ON HOW MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS. SUGGEST STATION OUTLINE

DATE: 24 OCT 75  
 ORIG: TGSHACKLEY:DCM  
 UNIT: C/EA  
 EXT: 1428

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 CL BY: 061991



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CLASSIFICATION

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

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MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

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INFO: FILE

759641

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0 IP FILES #

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE PROCESS I.E., STATION RECEIVES OD FROM HQS AND COMMENTS ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AG'S WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL [ ] TO FOCUS ON KEY OBJECTIVE IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW DISCUSSION DOWN TO AG-4 OR AG-7. THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD INCLUDE COMMENTARY ON FUNDING BY FAN'S, ETC. 4

C. AGENT ACQUISITION. WITH FOCUS OF BRIEFING BEING ON AG-4 OR AG-7, STATION COULD THEN OUTLINE HOW TARGET STUDIES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES <sup>ARE</sup> ~~IS~~ CONDUCTED, POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED AND HOW SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS. IN DISCUSSION OF RECRUITMENT PHASE OF OPERATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE EXAMINATION OF NAME TRACE AND POA PROCESS. 4

D. AGENT AUTHENTICATION. DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESSMAN SHOULD ALSO OUTLINE HOW AGENT AUTHENTICATED ONCE RECRUITED. STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTICATION, SECURITY OF MEETINGS, ETC. 4

DATE:

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UNIT:

EXT:

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CL BY: 061991

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**SECRET**  
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MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

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INFO: FILE

DIRECTOR

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E. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION. ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT, TURNING IT INTO INTEL DISSEMINATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM, AND REPORTS EVALUATION CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED. Y

F. OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM. STARTING WITH RECRUITMENT OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED BY AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E., PRQ PART I AND 2, CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS, PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS, PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND FIELD PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER, STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED <sup>FEED BACK</sup> ON ~~FEED BACK~~ FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON. Y

G. CASE HISTORY. IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY ACTIVE SOURCES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. IN VIEW OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO UNDERSCORE ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE

DATE:  
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 CL BY: 061791

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PROTECTION. THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS

AND ASSUME IT WILL BE USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR [ ] Y

2. BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO ZERO IN ON STATION'S COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCID'S FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPS. ALSO THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE PART OF BRIEFING CONCENTRATE ON IMMINENCE OF HOSTILITIES INDICATORS WHICH NOW BEING WORKED ON BY AMERICAN INTEL COMMUNITY IN CONSULTATION WITH [ ] THIS MIGHT WELL SHOW COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES INVOLVED IN MEASURING INTEL SUCCESS OR FAILURES. Y

3. HQS HAS HAD LIMITED EXPOSURE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, THUS UNABLE TO SHED ANY LIGHT ON QUESTION POSED IN REF B PARA 2. BASIC GUIDELINE FOR THIS BRIEFING MUST BE FULL CANDOR WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY PROTECTING SOURCES AND METHODS. Y

4. PLEASE USE ABOVE INDICATORS ON FUTURE TRAFFIC DEALING WITH BRIEFINGS OR TRAVELS OF CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS WHO INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATION OF INTEL COMMUNITY. E-2, IMPDET.H

AC/EA/JK *[Signature]*  
DC/EA *[Signature]*  
C/EA/COPS *[Signature]*  
A/DDO *[Signature]*  
C/REVIEW STAFF *[Signature]*  
C/OLC *[Signature]*

DATE: 24 OCT 75  
ORIG: TGSACKLEY:DCM  
UNIT: C/EA  
EXT: 1428

DDO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

*[Signature]*  
THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, C/EA  
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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Senator's Travel File

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PAGE 01

IN 722803

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25645

S E C R E T 240620Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE [ ] 25645

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

NIACT DIRECTOR

RYBAT CODEL

REF: A. DIRECTOR 758492

B. DIRECTOR 758427

1. CODEL MURPHY ARRIVED [ ] EVENING 23 OCTOBER

[ ] DUE HOSPITALIZATION OF COS, DCOS

CONTACTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD AND OFFERED SEPARATE

BRIEFING IF DESIRED. IN BRIEF CONVERSATION [ ]

[ ] ON MORNING OF 24 OCTOBER IN

WHICH DCOS PARTICIPATED, REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD REITERATED

POINTS COVERED IN REFERENT A MESSAGE AND STATED HE HAD

BEEN CHARGED BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN TO MAKE A

DETAILED STUDY OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS IN THE FIELD.

HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BREAK OFF FROM DELEGATION

SCHEDULE AS OF 0900 OCTOBER 25 TO COMMENCE DISCUSSIONS.

WHILE PARAMETERS OF HIS<sup>5</sup> INTERESTS NOT FULLY COVERED IN

INITIAL CONVERSATION, HE ANTICIPATES DEVOTING ONE/F NOT

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IN 722803

TOR:240650Z OCT 75

25645


SEVERAL DAYS TO DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES.

2. REP. LUCIEN NEDZI WAS ALSO CONTACTED WITH OFFER OF STATION BRIEFING WHICH WAS RECEIVED IN FRIENDLY FASHION. REP. NEDZI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH LATER DURING THEIR FIVE DAY STAY.

3. COS MAY BE RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL MORNING OF 25 OCTOBER. WHETHER HE IS OR NOT, COS PREPARED TO TALK WITH REP. MILFORD EITHER AT HOSPITAL OR AT RESIDENCE WHERE HE WILL NEED BE CONFINED FOR ONE WEEK RECUPERATION. THIS OFFER BEING CONVEYED TO CONGRESSMAN, AND IF AGREEABLE TO HIM, ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR HIM TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH COS.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE BY 0800 LOCAL 25 OCTOBER AS REP. MILFORD'S INTERESTS OBVIOUSLY EXTEND TO DETAILED PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS BEYOND NORMAL SCOPE OF FIELD BRIEFINGS.

E2 IMPDET



S E C R E T

## OUTGOING MESSAGE

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

231741Z

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

758926

CONF:

C/NE-3

INFO: FILE

DCI/REVIEW STAFF, C/RF,  
DDO, DDO/DO, SA/DOO

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DISSEM BY: Q  
 PER SA

TO:

ADMIN 4

1. ALL SIGNIFICANT CABLE TRAFFIC RELATING TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF CIA SHOULD CARRY IDEN SLUG.4

2. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY ADDRESSEES MAY USE PLARGYLE RATHER THAN IDEN SLUG. IN SUCH INSTANCES, NE DIVISION WILL ASSURE THAT APPROPRIATE HQS COMPONENTS ARE APPRISED OF PERTINENT PORTIONS OF THOSE MESSAGES. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975

ORIG:

UNIT: NE/COPS

EXT: R-1562

RELEASING OFFICER

C/NE

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

NE/COPS

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E 2 IMPDET  
 CL BY: 056382

## OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

231741Z

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

758927

CONF:

C/NE-3

INFO: FILE

DC/REVIEW STAFF, C3/RF

DDO, DDO/DO, SA/DDO

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TO:

ADMIN 4

REF: DIRECTOR

758926

IDEN: PLMHCONGA, E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975

ORIG:

UNIT: NE/COPS

EXT: R-1562

RELEASING OFFICER  
 C/NE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

NE/COPS  
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CL BY: 056382





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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

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CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

757742

CONF: C/EUR

INFO: FILE

DCI (REVIEW STAFF).

CS/RF, DDO. SA/DDO.

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 28  
 0 NO INDEX  
 0 RETURN TO PER DDO  
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TO:

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR REPORTING ON VISIT MR. DAVID AARON.  
 PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC RELATED  
 TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES OF  
 UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLKMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC  
 AT YOUR DISCRETION. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 21 OCTOBER 75

RELEASING OFFICER

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS  
ROUTING SHEET


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15 C/SE				
16 C/LA				
17 SA/DDO CT-5				

10 NOV 1975

SUSPENSE DATE

REMARKS



Senator Church?

17 OCT 75 13 49

SIGNATURE

SA / ADDO

DATE

17 OCT 1975

17 OCT 1975

DDO 75-5707

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs

SUBJECT : The Director's Greeting Card List

1. It is requested that you provide recommendations as to whom the Director should send holiday greetings. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO in Room 7E22 by the close of business 10 November 1975.

2. Your list should be prepared on a very selected basis. You may include the names of chiefs of foreign security and intelligence services and the names of non-intelligence personnel abroad who are of special interest or significance to the Agency mission. In most cases, these names should be those of persons whom the Director has met here or abroad.

3. After the Director has reviewed the lists of recommended names, the greeting cards will be prepared and sent to the appropriate Division or Staff for pouching or mailing.

  
SA/ADDO

## Distribution:

C/AF  
C/EA  
C/EUR  
C/DCD  
C/DIVD  
C/FR  
C/LA/  
C/NE

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E2 IMPDET  
CL BY 037796

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
17 OCT 1975

DDO 75-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs

SUBJECT : DDCI's Greeting Card List

Addressees are requested to prepare a Christmas card list for the DDCI. It should include, where security permits, all significant contacts hosted by him at Headquarters or visited in the field. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO by close of business 10 November 1975.



SA/ADDO

## Distribution:

C/AF	C/SE
C/EA	C/CCS
C/EUR	C/CI
C/DCD	C/OPS
C/DIVD	C/PS
C/FR	C/SS
C/LA	SA/DDO
C/NE	SPG/DDO

E2 IMPDET  
CL BY 037796

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

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EXTENSION

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

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OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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SA/ DDO

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17 OCT 75 13 12

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# DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS ROUTING SHEET

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14 C/NE				
15 C/SE				
16 C/LA				
17 SA/DDO Mr. Walker				
CT-5				

SUSPENSE DATE

REMARKS:

17 OCT 75 16 16

*File in my personal file*

SIGNATURE

EA/DDO

DATE

17 OCT. 75

FORM 3671 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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## DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

## ROUTING SHEET

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REMARKS:

17 OCT 75 16 16

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
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
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
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



1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 1, 1801. It is a very important document, as it is the first official communication of the new administration. The letter is written in a formal, dignified style, and it contains a great deal of information about the new government and the President's plans for the future. It is a document that has been studied and analyzed for many years, and it is still considered one of the most important documents in American history.

2. The second part of the document is a letter from the President to the Congress, dated January 1, 1801. It is a very important document, as it is the first official communication of the new administration. The letter is written in a formal, dignified style, and it contains a great deal of information about the new government and the President's plans for the future. It is a document that has been studied and analyzed for many years, and it is still considered one of the most important documents in American history.

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TOP:161514Z OCT 75

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SECRET 161302Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE [ ] 43369

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLKMBALL

\*Recommend dissemination  
to D/OLC & DCI (Review)

1. MR. AARON MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AT LUNCHEON 15 OCTOBER, SAID HE WAS STAFF EMPLOYEE OF SENATOR MONSDALE AND WAS HEAD OF SELECT COMMITTEE TASK FORCE FORMERLY CALLED WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE BUT RENAMED COMMAND AND CONTROL TASK FORCE. MR. AARON SAID HE FELT COMMITTEE WOULD CONCLUDE ITS WORK IN FEBRUARY AS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED.

2. AARON SAID IT HIS OPINION THAT AS CONCERNED WRONGDOINGS CIA'S RECORD WAS PROBABLY BETTER THAN SOME OF THE OTHER INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. HE MENTIONED THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION IN THIS CONTEXT. HE SAID IF WE FELT THAT CIA HAVING DIFFICULT TIME WITH CHURCH COMMITTEE WE SHOULD WAIT AND SEE WHAT HAPPENS TO FBI WHO WERE "GOING TO HAVE THEIR CLOCKS CLEANED." SAID FBI HAD GONE 50 YEARS WITHOUT REVISION AND VAST AMOUNT OF WRONGDOING HAD RESULTED FROM THIS SITUATION.

3. ALSO OF INTEREST, [ ]

[ ] WHO WAS PRESENT DURING AARON'S SESSIONS WITH ARMY

SECRET

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EIA898

PAGE 02-02

IN 715761

TOR:161514Z OCT 75

43369

COMPONENTS, INFORMED US 15 OCTOBER THAT HIS IMPRESSION BASED ON  
TALKS WITH MR. AARON, LATTER WOULD LIKE SEE CIA TAKE OVER POSITIVE  
COLLECTION ELEMENT OF THE [ ] MR. AARON MADE SIMILAR  
COMMENTS TO US, AS WE REPORTING SEPARATELY. E2 IMPDET.













6.0875 1658

Review Staff: 75/3149/aDate 6 October 1975*Marge File*

TO : CIA Task Force

FROM : The Review Staff, Walter Elder

SUBJECT : SSC/HSC Request

RECEIVED: Date 3 October Time 1905

The attached letter requests an orientation briefing for David Aaron who is travelling again this time to

Comments: *1<sup>st</sup> Meeting - Briefing on 8 Oct 1975 by D. Elder & Fendig*  
*2<sup>nd</sup> Briefing - 10 Oct 75 by Fendig*

	Action	Info
SC/DCI		X
A/DDA		X
A/DDI		X
A/DDO	<i>SS/H</i>	
A/DDS&T		X
OGC		X
OLC		X
IG		X
B. Evans		X
SA/DDO	<i>✓</i>	

75-3149

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN  
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WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.  
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## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 5, 1975

[redacted]  
Assistant to the Director  
Room 6D0120  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Bolten:

This letter is to request an orientation briefing for  
a visit to [redacted] which a member of  
the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to  
make this month.



Sincerely,

*Bob*

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department

OCT 7 05 1975

FRANK R. MURPHY, IDAHO, C. IAN  
 JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE HMAN  
 PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.  
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# United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
 STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
 RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 3, 1975

REVIEW STAFF


75-3150

Mr. William G. Hyland  
 Director  
 Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
 Department of State  
 Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Hyland:

This letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month.

Although the plans are not yet precise, it is expected that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October 16 and 17.



Sincerely,

William G. Miller

copy to  CIA

52.11.50 2 8 130

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) ..

FROM:

*John Walker*  
*2B-1415*

EXTENSION

*9135*  
*9018*

NO.

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*26 September 1975*

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*Mr. Rogers**10/6**WC*

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*John Walker*  
*File*

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*Notes:*  
*Attached is*  
*worth reading.*  
*I report on a*  
*trip of Daniel*  
*Caron and Bill*  
*Trichard (both S&C)*  
*to Latin America.*  
*Notes page 18,*  
*BRIL 24723.*

*Thanks!*  
*m*

*Stigman*

*7 Oct 75 1450*







































































































*file under  
SSC travel*

S E C R E T

20 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LA Division

SUBJECT : Transmittal of SSC Memo Announcing  
the Intention of SSC Staffers to  
Visit Latin America

1. Attached is a xerox of a letter from the SSC Staff Director (Review Staff 75-2399) describing travel plans to Latin America on the part of SSC Staffers. This is for your information. You will be alerted when this becomes firm and an itinerary is established.

2. Also attached is an agreed upon memo giving guidelines of such trips. Supplementing this should be a briefing of the travelling of SSC Staffers before they go and a notification of the stations involved as to what the guidelines are.

John H. Waller  
SA/DDOAttachment  
As stated aboveDistribution:  
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att  
2 - SA/DDOE2 IMPDET  
CL BY 055636

S E C R E T

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and  
Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.

I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE  
ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE  
INSTALLATIONS.

Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions

6/25/75

that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public exposure of such relationships. To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.

III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms--operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.

IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.



V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES  
WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.

VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN  
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized.

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
# United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 12, 1975



[Redacted]  
Assistant to the Director  
Room 6D0120  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. [Redacted]

This letter is to confirm an oral request by Committee staff for an orientation briefing for a visit to South America which two members of the staff, David Aaron and William Trueheart, have been asked to make next month.

Although plans are not yet firm, it is expected that they will be free to travel during the second and third weeks of September.

[Redacted]

Messrs. Aaron and Trueheart are not expected to consult with officials of the host government and, so far as the Committee is concerned, the latter need not be informed of the visit.

Sincerely yours,

*Bill*

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department

*Done: C/LA + 3 LAffairs  
completed briefing  
on 17 Sept 1975  
mcy*

## OUTGOING MESSAGE

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TO: PRIORITY

REF: STATE 137637, 30 JUNE 1975 Y

1. SENATOR TOWER, MEMBER OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (ASC) AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING CIA, IS TRAVELING IN EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND WITH AIR FORCE ESCORT. [ ] HAS ADVISED THAT SENATOR TOWER WILL BE IN [ ] 3-7 JULY WHERE HE WILL CALL ON [ ]

R 2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELING ON ASC BUSINESS, SENATOR TOWER MAY TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE ACTIVITY [ ] IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING, STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HIM WITH ONE. YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL INTEL EXCHANGE WITH THE [ ] BUT SEE NO NEED TO TOUCH ON ANY JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND [ ] [ ] CONTACTS.

3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, IN THE EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HQS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR

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ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HQS IS ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE<sup>IV</sup>, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY, AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 2 JULY 1975

ORIG: [REDACTED]

UNIT: [REDACTED]

EXT: [REDACTED]

EXHT

{TELECOORD}  
 SA/DDO - WALLER IN SUBSTANCE  
 OLC - MILLER R. CHAN

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THE COS WILL PROBABLY WISH TO MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY BRIEFING SENATOR TOWER MAY REQUEST. 4

3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, <sup>IN THE</sup> EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HQS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS

IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HQS IS ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. E2 IMPDET.H

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

C/SS/CAG

3D0004

EXTENSION

R9125

NO.

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28 July 1975

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

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1. Mr. John Waller  
SA/DDO 2B1415

29 JUL 1975

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22 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Waller  
Special Assistant to DDO

SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations  
Against Right-Wing Governments

REFERENCE: SS/CAG Memorandum of 18 July 1975,  
Same Subject

We have reviewed referent memorandum and have the following comments on those paragraphs which concern

13. [ ] While this case is somewhat bizarre and does not represent a productive operation, we pose no objection to its being presented to the Senate Select Committee.

14. [ ] We have no objection to the presentation of these programs to the Senate Select Committee for review although we share concern expressed by SS/CAG that a leak of this information would be detrimental to the base negotiations.

signed/William W. Wells

William W. Wells  
Chief, European Division

DDO/DC/E/NW [ ] (22 July 75)

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July 20

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select  
Committee and Their Staffs While  
Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:

- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to a host government.

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In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.

- Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.
- Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.
- Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

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No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.

- Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

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PAGE 01

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S E C R E T 301128Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE [ ] 628897

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF DIRECTOR 712872

1. IN MEETING WITH COS ON 30 JUNE, [ ] TOLD COS THAT HE HAD LUNCH WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE AND ENGAGED IN BRIEF GENERAL DISCUSSION OF INVESTIGATION OF BKERHALD BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. [ ] FOUND SENATOR MONDALE ENTIRELY REASONABLE IN HIS APPROACH AND FULLY AWARE OF DIFFICULTY OF JUDGING EVENTS AND DECISIONS OF EARLY 1960'S BY STANDARDS OF 1975.

2. [ ] SENATOR MONDALE STATED THAT HE HAD MADE SOME EFFORT TO CONTACT [ ] ON JUNE 28 WITHOUT SUCCESS. IN LIGHT OF REF, COS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO CONTACT SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE. IN CONVERSATION WITH COS ON 30 JUNE,

[ ] IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK FORWARDED REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE TO MEET [ ] ON 30 JUNE. SINCE [ ] HAD TO BE IN PARIS ON 28 JUNE AND [ ] HAD NOT YET RETURNED FROM HIS ASIAN

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T 126005

EIA165

PAGE 02-02

IN 620738

TOR1301301Z JUN 75

628897

TRIP, [REDACTED] WASHINGTON WAS ASKED TO INFORM MONDALE  
 THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME. THIS IS FOR  
 YOUR BACKGROUND IN EVENT SENATOR RAISES THE POINT WITH HQS.  
 E2 IMPDET.

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T 121509

EIA815

PAGE 01

IN 619528

TOR1271651Z JUN 75

41001

S E C R E T 271217Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE [ ] 41001

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

FROM [ ]

REF DIRECTOR 708791

1. IT WILL GREATLY FACILITATE PLANNING SCHEDULE FOR SENATOR MONDALE IF A MORE SPECIFIC ITINERARY CAN BE OBTAINED TOGETHER WITH SOME INDICATION OF HOW MUCH TIME THE SENATOR PLANS TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO US DURING HIS [ ] VISIT. IN VIEW OF THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE [ ] GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ARE NOT CENTRALLY LOCATED IN ONE PLACE, PLUS [ ]

[ ] I AM GIVING THOUGHT TO HAVING CHIEFS OF BASE [ ] PARTICIPATE BUT AS OF PRESENT TIME WE UNCERTAIN EVEN WHAT DAY SENATOR WILL ACTUALLY BE IN [ ]

2. WE ALSO PERPLEXED BY PARA 6 REF RE "SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT WITH THE [ ] AS HQS AWARE [ ]

[ ] WE ARE EQUALLY PUZZLED BY THE COMMENT IN PARA 7 ABOUT 'SEEING THE [ ] FACILITY' WHICH SEEMS TO SUGGEST RESURGENCE OF LONG-STANDING MISCONCEPTION THAT [ ] IS A

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T 121509

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PAGE 02-02

IN 619528

TOR:271651Z JUN 75

41001

PHYSICAL FACILITY HOUSING [ ] THERE  
IS NO [ ] FACILITY AS SUCH, JUST A FEW SAFE APARTMENTS  
[ ] AND I PLAN TO BRIEF THE SENATOR ON [ ]  
ACTIVITIES AS PART OF THE [ ] PRESENTATION. IF THE SENATOR  
PLANS TO VISIT ANY OTHER LOCATION [ ] IN  
ADDITION [ ] WE URGENTLY REQUEST EARLY ADVICE THEREOF.

3. ASSUME SENATOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN GENERAL TERMS AT LEAST  
ON AGENCY PROCEDURES FOR TRACING AND CLEARING OPERATIONAL SOURCES,  
REPORTING ON THEIR ACTIVITIES, AND AGENCY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING  
PROCEDURES, BUT WOULD PLAN USE THESE PROCEDURES AS FRAMEWORK  
IN DESCRIBING EXERCISE OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN THE FIELD,  
IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR AREAS  
OF STATION OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY.

4. WILL GREATLY APPRECIATE ETA OF SENATOR AND PARTY [ ]  
AS SOON AS THIS CAN POSSIBLY BE PROCURED. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

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PAGE 01

IN 619109

TORI271119Z JUN 75

62823

S E C R E T 271112Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE            62823

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF A. DIRECTOR 708791

B. STATE 146723 DTD 21 JUNE

C. STATE 150884 DTD 26 JUNE

1. WE NOTE CHANGES IN SENATOR MONDALE TRIP.

2. REFS B & C INDICATE MONDALE ARRIVING            28 JUNE  
DEPARTING 29TH, TRAVELLING            THEN RETURNING TO WASHINGTON           ON 7 JULY. NO MENTION OF OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY  
EXCEPT MRS. MONDALE. REALIZE INFO MAY BE COVER FOR TRIP, BUT  
WOULD LIKE CLARIFICATION. DOES SENATOR EXPECT BRIEFINGS           ON 28TH VICE 30 JUNE AND 1 JULY?

3. PLS ADVISE. E2 IMPDET

\* NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT

S E C R E T

## OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE 1 OF 1

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DIRECTOR

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CONF: C/EUR

INFO: FILE C/IA/AN, ~~DDO~~ DDO/AD,  
 OLC, C/SS3, C/PS/EG2,  
 C/C/OP3

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TO:

RYBAT 4

REFS: A.

62701 | IN 616087 |

B.

62615 | IN 613590 | 4

DHB ✓  
 JW copy sent

AS YET WE HAVE NOT HEARD FURTHER ON THE MONDALE VISIT  
 NOR HAS EUR DIVISION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF ANY OF THE  
 MEMBERS OF THE CODEL. IN ANSWER TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS,  
 WE HAVE ALREADY FORWARDED [ ] BY SEPARATE CHANNEL THE CLEAR-  
 ANCE STATUS OF THE PARTY. WE HAVE QUERIED ABOUT THE SENATOR'S  
 KNOWLEDGE OF THE AGEE CASE, BUT KNOW OF NO SPECIAL BRIEFING GIVEN  
 HIM. WE PRESUME HE HAS READ THE NEWSPAPERS. SHOULD THE SUBJECT  
 ARISE, WE ARE PREPARED TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS FORTHRIGHTLY.  
 RATHER THAN DISCUSSING SPECIFIC COVERT ACTION PROJECTS AND DIVULGING  
 SOURCE NAMES, YOU SHOULD COVER THE GENERAL IDEAS BEHIND COVERT  
 ACTION ACTIVITIES, THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY WERE DEVELOPED  
 AND WHY THEY WERE TERMINATED. E2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 25 JUNE 1975  
 ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS  
 UNIT: C/EUR  
 EXT: 1012

WILLIAM W. WELLS, C/EUR

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN WALLER, SA/DDO

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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PAGE 01

IN 616087

TORI241622Z JUN 75

62701

**S E C R E T** 241451Z JUN 75 STAFFCITE                      62701

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

REF A, DIRECTOR 708791

B.                      62615

(013590)

1. RE PARA 5 REF A,                                     INFORMED COS AT LUNCH 24 JUNE THAT AS RESULT OF REQUEST FROM  
SENATOR MONDALE    ARE TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO MEET WITH SENATOR MONDALE

ON 1 JULY TO DISCUSS BOTH HOW POLICY CONTROL IS EXERCISED OVER

2.                      MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE AND                      WERE THE  
ONLY ONES AUTHORIZED TO DEAL WITH SENATOR MONDALE AND THAT  
SENATOR MONDALE WILL NOT BE MEETING WITH                                       
REPS.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY TO GUIDANCE REQUEST IN REF B.

E2 IMPDET

**S E C R E T**

SECRET

Review Staff: 75/1009  
24 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Senator Gary Hart's Request to Talk  
to QJWIN While Traveling in Europe

This is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent while the senator is traveling in Europe.

The agent is QJWIN. [REDACTED]

On the weekend of 7 June 1975, members of the Senate Select Committee staff spent many hours at Headquarters reading files, including QJWIN and ZRRIFLE, among others. QJWIN's true name contract is in the file which they read. So is a street and post office address as of 1964, the time when we ended our contract with this agent. We have not contacted him since.

We have heard that David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff telephoned QJWIN. This report remains unconfirmed. We have protested to Bill Miller.

It is difficult to imagine how a U.S. senator could talk to a former agent without arousing the interest of the local intelligence service [REDACTED] and of the host government who might wonder about the propriety of investigations being conducted on their territory and involving one of their citizens.

In any event, an approach of this nature would be of interest to the Department of State, and the senator might wish to consult with the Department before proceeding.

*Walter Elder*  
Walter Elder

CB: 007789  
E2 IMPDET

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Talking Points For Use With Senator Gary Hart On His Proposed  
Contact With QJWYN

1. Senatorial contact with a former CIA agent would run the risk of his exposure to his local government and the press. Because of his former activities and relationships he might be subjected to reprisals from abroad, possible prosecution for espionage at home from his local government and harassment from the media.
2. Active as well as former CIA agents abroad would have further cause to believe that the American intelligence service is incapable of protecting its informants from disclosure. Contacting an agent under the insecure conditions involved would violate the Agency's promise to this former informant to protect the confidentiality of the relationship.
3. Foreign intelligence services with which the CIA is in liaison would find this approach highly unprofessional and risky. It is bound to raise further questions about the dangers of continued confidential cooperation with the CIA.
4. It is possible that the local government involved might lodge a formal protest to the US mission protesting the unusual procedure of a Senate investigating committee interrogating its nationals in violation of its sovereignty without requesting formal permission.

6/24/75

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Exec. Reg. Registry

75-6905

Review Staff: 75/868  
20 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

This is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent of ours while traveling in Europe.

You should know that we have been told that the Senate Select Committee staff has already been in touch with this agent by telephone. We do not know how they learned his true name or his whereabouts. We have already advised David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff of a potential problem area in connection with such a proposed meeting. The agent in question is, of course, a subject of interest to the local intelligence service and we doubt that the host government or the intelligence service would agree that a United States senator, especially a member of the Senate Select Committee, may appropriately conduct such investigations within its territory without clearance to do so.

In any event, an approach of this nature would be of interest and indeed of concern to the Department of State and the senator might be well advised to consult with them before proceeding.

For your information, the agent referred to is QJWIN and we have not been in touch with him since about 1951.

/s/  
Walter Elder

EB

CB: 007789  
E2 IMPDET

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*Handcarried  
orig to DCI.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

6/25 DDO N/c  
ADDO B  
SA/DOO — ←

More facts, per your request, on the QJWIN matter.

Talking points for your use with Sen. Gary Hart are included.

H. Knoche 6-24-75  
(DATE)

PROPOSED DOD  
CHANGES SHOWN  
HERE, PP 2 and 5,  
WITHIN THE HEAVY  
BRACKETS,

SUBJECT: GUIDELINES FOR MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND  
THEIR STAFFS WHILE TRAVELING ABROAD

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.

I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.


Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. Their mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions that

25 June - latest version, incorporating  
proposed changes by DoD.

could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. [ Several foreign governments or entities thereof now willing to cooperate privately with the U.S. in intelligence agreements-exchanges maintain strong<sup>ly</sup> neutral or anti-U.S. foreign policies; continuation of such agreements-exchanges is therefore dependent upon avoidance of their public disclosure. In many cases termination of such agreements would result in the loss of unique strategic intelligence, and alternate collection methods are either not available or are prohibitively expensive. ]

To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.



*Agreement*  
III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

*1944*  
*- Banner*  
It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms--operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.

IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members

would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES  
WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.

VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL  
INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such

a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.

[ Senate Select Committee principals and staff should understand the distinction between U.S. intelligence installations abroad and joint U.S.-foreign intelligence installations or foreign intelligence installations supported by the U.S. intelligence community. Access to the former is at the discretion of the U.S. Ambassador; access to the latter two is at the discretion of the foreign government involved. ]

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized.

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PAGE 01

IN 613590

TOR1201921Z JUN 75

62615

**S E C R E T 201745Z JUN 75 STAFF**CITE   62615

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

REF A. DIRECTOR 707518

B. DIRECTOR 708791

1. THANK YOU FOR ADVICE REGARDING SENATOR MONDALE'S  
PROPOSED VISIT, AND   HAVE BOTH BEEN  
ALERTED.

2. IN RESPONSE TO PARA 6 REF A, COS PLANS TO BRIEF SENATOR  
MONDALE ON STRUCTURE  

AND THE NATURE OF OUR INTERFACE WITH IT WITH PARTICULAR STRESS  
ON THE GROUND RULES GOVERNING OUR RELATIONSHIP. COS WILL ALSO  
COVER THE STATION'S ORGANIZATION, PRIORITIES, AND THE GENERAL  
KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE  
ANSWERS TO A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THAT OCCUR TO US:

A. WHAT CLEARANCES DO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS TWO STAFF  
ASSISTANTS ~~HAVE?~~ <sup>HAVE?</sup> B. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE SENATOR BEEN INFORMED  
ABOUT AGEE CASE, AND IN WHAT DETAIL SHOULD THIS CASE BE COVERED  
WITH HIM AND HIS TWO ASSISTANTS? C. TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD

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EIA405

PAGE 02-02

IN 613590

TOR1201921Z JUN 75

62615

SPECIFIC CA PROJECTS BE DESCRIBED. ASSUME THERE IS NOT OBJECTIONS  
TO POINTING OUT THE DAMAGE DONE BY LEAKAGE IN WASHINGTON TO  
TOHAWKBIT, AS A WAY OF DRAMATIZING THE NEED FOR SECURITY IN THE  
COURSE OF THE SENATE INVESTIGATION. D. IF THE STATION  
IS TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SENATOR'S HOTEL AND TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS,  
WE WOULD APPRECIATE BEING SO INFORMED. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

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DIRECTOR

708791

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c/c/OP3.

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TO:

RYBATY

REF: DIRECTOR 707518 (NOT NEEDED)

1. (REF CONCERNED VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE TO EUROPE IN EARLY JULY ON SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES.) Y

2. SENATOR MONDALE'S ITINERARY IS NOT YET FIRM. NOW APPEARS HE WILL ARRIVE [ ] ON 30 JUNE FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN PROCEED OSLO AND HELSINKI FOR VISITS NOT CONNECTED WITH SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES. CURRENT PLANS BRING HIM TO [ ] 7 JULY FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN TO [ ] (1 DAY) AND [ ] (2 DAYS). NO DECISION YET AS TO WHICH CITY WILL BE VISITED [ ] (DIRECTLY FROM)

3. MR. DAVID AARON ADVISES THAT SENATOR WISHES THE DISCUSSIONS TO BE GENERIC IN NATURE. HE WANTS TO KNOW THE STATIONS' PRIORITIES AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN, BUT HE IS NOT SEEKING SPECIFICS. Y

4. MR. AARON STATES THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF SELECT COMMITTEE CONNECTIONS, AND IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE SENATOR'S PARTY WILL BE TRAVELING BY AIR FORCE OR COMMERCIAL

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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708790

AIRCRAFT.4

5. [ ] MR. AARON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH [ ]  
 [ ] BUT NOT THROUGH CIA ARRANGEMENT. SENATOR MONDALE HAS  
 ASKED FOR DISCUSSIONS [ ]

WE ARE

NOT ASKED FOR ANY ASSISTANCE IN THIS AFFAIR.4

6. [ ] SENATOR MONDALE PLANS A SIMILAR INDEPENDENT  
 CONTACT [ ]

7. IN A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE TRIP, MR. AARON SAID THAT IN  
 [ ] THE SENATOR WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND  
 HOW THESE AFFECT THE OPERATIONAL PICTURE IN THAT CITY. [ ]  
 THE SENATOR WILL WISH TO LOOK INTO [ ] RELATIONS AND  
 MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN SEEING THE [ ] FACILITY. [ ]  
 THE SENATOR WILL EXPECT TO REVIEW THE STATION'S VARIED PROGRAM. 4

8. WE NOTED THE SENATOR'S INVESTIGATION MAY STILL BE SUBJECT  
 TO HIGHER LEVEL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DIRECTION OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT  
 YET BEEN INFORMED. E2, IMPDET.4

DATE: 17 JUNE 1975

ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS

E.H. KNOCH

UNIT: C/EUR

EXT: 1012

*W. W. Wells*  
 WILLIAM W. WELLS, C/EUR

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

*John Waller*  
 JOHN WALLER, SA/DDO

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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**SECRET**

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE AND PLACE: 17 June 1975 1000 - 1100  
Room 2E-45

SUBJECT: Conversation by Mr. John Waller, SA/DDO with  
Mr. David Aaron, member of Senator Mondale's  
staff, with Regard to the Senator's Proposed  
Trip to Europe

1. According to Mr. Aaron the Senator and Mr. Aaron's itinerary,  
while not yet fixed, will be along the following lines:

a. 30 June - 1 July

b. Monday, 7 June:

c. [ ] Although the order has not yet been  
determined, the [ ] stop would be two days and the  
[ ] stop, one day.

In the period between [ ] the party intends to visit  
Oslo and Helsinki. The purpose of this part of the trip, however,  
has nothing to do with the SSC [ ]

[ ]

[ ]

**SECRET**

E2 IMPDET  
CL BY 055636

**SECRET**

- 2 -



5. Mr. Waller commented that such approaches to foreign governments would make our liaison services uneasy and could adversely affect their willingness to cooperate. To this reason, we did not favor involving foreign governments -- at whatever level or wherever in the bureaucracy. Moreover, contacts with foreign governments increased the likelihood that the true purpose of the Senator's trip could leak to the press. Mr. Waller mentioned that he would want to bring this to the attention of others.

6. Mr. Aaron agreed that the Senator, through press conferences or otherwise, would not make public the fact that his trip was connected with Select Committee investigations.

7. Mr. Aaron said that he and the Senator were in touch with Mr. Hyland of the State Department with regard to this trip. He also suggested that they might get in touch with military intelligence services in Washington and in the field. He made specific reference to "Naval Intelligence".

8. Mr. Aaron stressed the fact that the itinerary was still tentative and subject to change.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

- 3 -

9. At one point, Mr. Aaron asked if CIA had any aircraft in Europe which could be put at Senator Mondale's disposal. Mr. Waller replied negatively.

10. Mr. Aaron felt that it was unlikely that Mr. Bader would be a member of the Senator's party.

Distribution:

1 - Mr. Knoche  
1 - Mr. Wells  
1 - Miss Page

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**SECRET**

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RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

**S E C R E T**REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN  
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**STAFF**

ACTION UNIT

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B.F. FILE

VR

411AN, DDO, OLC, ICS,

4C10P3, 4OPS, 4PSIEG2

ACTION #

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PAGE 01

IN 608574

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26077

**S E C R E T 160853Z JUN 75 STAFF**CITE  26077

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 707518

1. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD GENERALLY PLAN BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE ON STATION'S POSITION WITHIN  PRIMARY TARGETS, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT FOR OPERATIONS, CAN OF COURSE ADJUST TO SUIT HIS REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL COME INTO CLEARER FOCUS AFTER HQS BRIEFING MENTIONED PARA 0 REF.

2. IF POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION THAT STAFF AIDE, MR. WILLIAM BADER (PARA 2 REF) IS IDENTICAL WITH PERSON OF SAEM NAME WHO WAS FORD FOUNDATION REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS LATE SIXTIES AND AT THAT TIME WAS NAVAL RESERVE LIEUTENANT COMMANDER.

3. NO FILE, E2 IMPDET.

*D*  
*OWB*  
*JW*

**S E C R E T**

## COMBINATION MESSAGE

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SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY  
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 OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF 1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

141651Z

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

707518

CONF: C/WR 6 INFO: FILE DCI, D/DCI, (DAO), CS/RF, OAC,  
 C/PLAN, DD/DO, C/LOPS, C/OPS, C/LSN/D,

☐ INDEX DISSEM BY: 38  
☐ NO INDEX  
☐ RETURN TO PER  
☐ ID FILES #

TO:

RYBAT 4

SUBJECT: THE VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE OF MINNESOTA TO EUROPE  
 AT THE END OF THE MONTH. 4

1. THE SENATORIAL PARTY WISHES TO VISIT [REDACTED]  
 TO EXAMINE AGENCY COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE FIELD. SENATOR  
 MONDALE WILL WISH TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT HOW STATIONS OPERATE AND  
 THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE [REDACTED] PRESUMABLY  
 THE SENATOR WILL ALSO WISH TO EXAMINE OUR [REDACTED] RELATIONS. 4

2. SENATOR MONDALE WILL BE TRAVELING WITH HIS PERSONAL  
 AIDE, MR. DAVID AARON, WHO IS THE DIRECTOR OF THE TASK FORCE  
 ON COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTI-  
 GATING CIA ACTIVITIES. MR. WILLIAM BADER, A SECOND STAFF MEMBER,  
 MAY ALSO ACCOMPANY THE SENATOR. 4

3. HEADQUARTERS WILL <sup>REQUEST OF</sup> ~~SUGGEST~~ TO SENATOR MONDALE THAT HE USE  
 OTHER REASONS THAN THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION FOR  
 HIS TRAVEL IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS. WE DO NOT KNOW,  
 HOWEVER, IF HE WILL AGREE. 4

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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## OUTGOING MESSAGE

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SECRET

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select  
Committee and Their Staffs While  
Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:

- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to a host government.

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In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.

- Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.
- Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.
- Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

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No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.

- Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

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SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select  
Committee and Their Staffs While  
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There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:

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6/18/75

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and  
Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.


I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD PUBLICLY APPEAR  
TO BE ABROAD FOR SOME PURPOSE OTHER THAN THE  
INVESTIGATION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions



that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public exposure of such relationships. Some reason other than SSC business should be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff to help maintain the discreet nature of the visit. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.



III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U. S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL  
SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of, or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.

IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT  
PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be

to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters.

Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.

VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered

essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized.

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